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Merryman Redux: A Response to Professor
John Yoo
Seth Barrett Tillman*
In a recent issue of Chapman Law Review, Professor John
Yoo wrote, “While FDR did not join Lincoln’s blatant defiance in
declining to obey a judicial order, [Roosevelt’s] administration
regularly proposed laws that ran counter to Supreme Court
precedent . . . .”1 My focus in this short, responsive Article is on
Professor Yoo’s specific claim regarding Lincoln.
Professor Yoo’s claim is odd—isn’t it? He tells us that Lincoln
passively “declin[ed] to obey a judicial order,” but also
characterizes Lincoln’s passivity as “blatant defiance.”2 Odd. He
cites to no particular case, and he cites to no specific judicial order
in any case. Very odd. We are all just supposed to know that the
case was Ex parte Merryman,3 a Civil War case, and the purported
judicial order was issued by that old curmudgeon: Chief Justice
Roger Brooke Taney.4 In a prior publication, in 2015, Professor
Yoo wrote that Lincoln had “ignored Taney’s order releasing
* Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law, Ireland. Roinn Dlí Ollscoil
Mhá Nuad. University of Chicago, BA (honors); Harvard Law School, JD (cum laude);
clerked for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, and the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. I thank Professor Josh Blackman for his comments.
1 John Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 215, 222
(2018) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Professor Yoo has a long line of scholarship
making this or similar claims. See John Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, 20 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 1, 24 (2015); John Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: of Merryman and Milligan
and McCardle, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 505, 513 (2009); John Yoo, Lincoln at War, 38 VT. L. REV.
3, 17–20 (2013); John Yoo, Merryman and Milligan (and McCardle), 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
243, 244 (2009); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 820 (2013).
2 What would constitute “blatant defiance”? If Lincoln had ordered the Army to
arrest the Chief Justice due to the latter’s having issued the Merryman opinion that could
be fairly characterized as defiance. For a fuller discussion of what constitutes “defiance,”
see Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship, 224 MIL.
L. REV. 481, 511–13 (2016). Note, several paragraphs or substantial parts of paragraphs of
this Article were first published in my 2016 Military Law Review publication.
3 See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.);
4 A COLLECTION OF IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS BY THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1400–12 (Cynthia Rapp & Ross E. Davies comps., 2004),
http://tinyurl.com/judtw8q [http://perma.cc/BM52-FKXU].
4 A COLLECTION OF IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS, supra note 3, at 1400.
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Merryman.”5 “Ignored”—no mention of defiance here. On another
occasion, in 2009, Professor Yoo characterized Lincoln’s response
to Merryman as “outright presidential defiance.”6 But here the
passive language of “ignoring” and “declining to obey” was
absent. Now, in 2018, Professor Yoo says it is both.7 We are down
the rabbit hole.
So, which is it?
[A] Lincoln passively declined to obey a judicial order;
[B] Lincoln actively defied the Chief Justice; or
[C] Both.
The correct answer is [D] None of the Above.
***
In 2016, I made an effort to explain why the standard
narrative (i.e., the narrative put forth by Professor Yoo and many
others) surrounding Merryman is wrong. In other words, the
standard restatement of the facts, reasoning, and disposition of
Merryman appearing in many (if not most) law review articles is
wrong.8 Some people have noticed,9 and some people (apparently)
5 Yoo, Judicial Supremacy Has Its Limits, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted).
6 Yoo, Lincoln and Habeas: Of Merryman and Milligan and McCardle, supra
note 1, at 507.
7 See Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222.
8 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 483. I do not claim to be the first to have noticed the
many significant problems with the standard legal narrative. See, e.g., id. at 497 n.45
(citing BRIAN MCGINTY, THE BODY OF JOHN MERRYMAN: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS 91–92 (2011); BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, EX PARTE MERRYMAN
AND DEBATES ON CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR 4 (2007); JACK STARK,
PROHIBITED GOVERNMENT ACTS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 48 (2002); Frank I. Michelman, Living with Judicial Supremacy, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 579, 595 n.69 (2003). See generally JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM
LINCOLN AND TREASON IN THE CIVIL WAR: THE TRIALS OF JOHN MERRYMAN (2011). For an
entirely different approach to Merryman, see generally David Farnham, “A High and
Delicate Trust”: How Ignorance and Indignation Combined to Expand President Lincoln’s
Claimed Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus in the Case of John Merryman, 24 J. S. LEGAL
HIST. 109 (2016).
9 Prominent commentators, in law and other fields, discussing, quoting, or citing my
2016 Military Law Review article include: RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CASES IN CONTEXT 532 & n.4 (3d ed. 2018); PAUL BREST ET
AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 314 n.89,
317 & n.90 (7th ed. 2018); LOUIS FISHER, SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER: UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEANINGS 41 n.124 (2017); ERIC M. FREEDMAN, MAKING
HABEAS WORK: A LEGAL HISTORY 145 n.19 (2018); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, UNCIVIL
WARRIORS: THE LAWYERS’ CIVIL WAR 199 n.1 (2018); MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL.,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 403 (3d ed. 2017); 3 WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Conduct of the War § 38.34 n.12 (3d ed. 2017); 1 RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 6.13(b)(i) n.12 (5th ed. 2017); PETER M. SHANE ET AL., SEPARATION OF
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have not.10 The issue here is more than historical curiosity, as
interesting and important as that may be. Rather, the issue here
relates to the intellectual claim (made by some) that past
presidents—including icons such as President Lincoln—knowingly
defied or ignored (that is, “declin[ed] to obey”) federal judicial
orders, and whether Lincoln’s conduct provides a model or
precedent, albeit if only during war-time or other emergency. My
view is that Lincoln’s Merryman-related conduct furnishes no such
model. Here is why.

POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1124 (4th ed. 2018); Josh Blackman, The
Irrepressible Myths of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming June 2019)
(manuscript at 11 n.71), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3142846;
Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln, Presidential Power, and the Rule of Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
667, 682 nn.80–83, 684 n.94, 685 n.98 (2018); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and
Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 492 n.146 (2018); Ethan J. Leib
& Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Fiduciary Constitutionalism and ‘Faithful Execution’:
Two Legal Conclusions, 17 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming June 2019) (manuscript
at 22 n.123), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3177968; Nicholas R.
Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the
Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 694 n.30 (2018); James E. Pfander
& Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Accountability, 102 VA. L. REV. 153, 184
n.123, 186 n.133 (2016); John Fabian Witt, A Lost Theory of American Emergency
Constitutionalism, 36 LAW & HIST. REV. 551, 569 n.84 (2018); Chase Harrington, Note,
Zivotofsky II and National Security Decisionmaking at the Lowest Ebb, 66 DUKE L.J.
1599, 1610 n.80 (2017); Peter William Bautz, Lincoln’s Long Shadow: Recreating the
Legal Debate over Habeas Corpus, 1861–1863, at 21 n.99 (May 2018) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, University of Virginia, Department of History) (on file with the University of Virginia),
https://tinyurl.com/y96uy8ys; Tanja Por nik, Imperial Presidency Redux?: Presidential War
Powers and the Bush Administration 68, 69, 123 (2016) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, Faculty of Social Sciences), http://dk.fdv.uni-lj.si/magistrska/
pdfs/mag_porcnik-tanja.pdf [http://perma.cc/G3C8-DP9Y]; U.S.C.A. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2
(West 2018); U.S.C.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (LexisNexis 2018); Al Mackey, Did President Lincoln
Defy a Court Order by Chief Justice Taney?, STUDENT AM. CIVIL WAR (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2016/10/17/did-president-lincoln-defy-a-court-order-by-chiefjustice-taney/ [http://perma.cc/XJ9L-AL4K]; Frank J. Williams, Fall 2016 Lincoln in the News,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN BICENTENNIAL FOUND., http://www.lincolnbicentennial.org/lincolnnews/fall-2016 [http://perma.cc/5ZEX-78TQ]; Allen C. Guelzo, Syllabus for Princeton
University’s Politics 488: Secession, the Civil War, and the Constitution 4 (Spring Semester
2018) (on file with author).
10 See, e.g., Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222.
Even post-2016, Professor John Yoo is not alone. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW
AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 113 (2018) (“Lincoln oversaw and defended the
defiance by Union military officers of a ruling by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in Ex parte
Merryman. Taney claimed the power to free an alleged Confederate collaborator in the
state of Maryland, where the Union army had effectively imposed martial law and
detained him without trial.” (footnote omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial
Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487,
504 (2018) (“In Ex parte Merryman, Lincoln supported Union military officers in
defying a writ of habeas corpus, issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney, in the early
days of the Civil War.” (footnote omitted)); cf., e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Propriety of Presidential Impeachments, Past and Present, LAW & LIBERTY (July 19, 2018),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2018/07/19/the-propriety-of-presidential-impeachmentspast-and-present/ [http://perma.cc/Z8QQ-TLN8].
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SHORT OVERVIEW OF EX PARTE MERRYMAN
The court11 issued three orders in Merryman. But to
understand what gave rise to those three judicial orders, one has
to know the facts that initially brought about the litigation.
A. Merryman: The Facts
Following the 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln, the parade
of state secession would begin. During April 1861, Fort Sumter
had fallen.12 Even Washington, the nation’s capital, was
threatened by Confederate armies, disloyal state militias, and
irregular combatants, not to mention disloyal civilians, assassins,
and spies. To secure the capital, President Lincoln directed
Union troops to proceed to Washington through Maryland,
a border state. 13 Mobs in Maryland had attacked Union
troops; bridges and railway lines had been destroyed; telegraph
wires to the capital had been cut.14 Why these attacks? Why all
this destruction of infrastructure? No doubt different actors had
different motives. Chance and disorder—the children of mob
rule—certainly played some role. But it seems likely that some
(perhaps many) sought to slow down or prevent the arrival of
loyal troops to secure Washington and, perhaps, to secure federal
military installations in Maryland, such as Fort McHenry in
Baltimore. (Certainly these were the natural, expected, and
probable consequences of the attacks, even if these results were
not specifically intended by the actors involved.) Lincoln
responded. On April 27, 1861, in order to secure the movement of
Union troops through Maryland, President Lincoln issued an
order delegating authority to General Winfield Scott to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.15 Lincoln’s order cited no statutory
basis for his decision.16
11 What court issued the decision in Ex parte Merryman? Some commentators say
Taney was acting for the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland; other
commentators say Merryman was issued as an in-chambers opinion under a special grant
of authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789. I take the latter view. See A COLLECTION OF
IN CHAMBERS OPINIONS, supra note 3, at 1400; Tillman, supra note 2, at 504 nn.55–56.
Whatever else Merryman was, it was not a Supreme Court case—for that reason, I use
“court,” rather than “Court” in the main text of this Article.
12 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 483 n.4.
13 See id. at 483 n.6.
14 See id.
15 The Constitution states: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added). President Lincoln’s order, issued on
April 27, 1861, only purported to give General Scott authority “to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.” See Abraham Lincoln, Order to General Scott (Apr. 27, 1861), in 6
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1860–1861, at 258, 258 (John G. Nicolay & John
Hay eds., N.Y., The Lamb Publishing Co. new ed. 1894) (reproducing Lincoln’s order);
Tillman, supra note 2, at 527 & n.116 (same). But see AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS
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IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY 358 n.3 (2017)
(characterizing Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order as a suspension of the “privilege”). But in
his July 4, 1861 message to Congress, Lincoln recharacterized his prior order as
permitting suspension of the “privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Abraham Lincoln,
Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6 COMPLETE WORKS, supra, at
297, 308 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added). The difference between suspending the
writ and suspending the privilege of the writ is night-and-day. See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130–31 (1866) (Davis, J.) (“The suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself.” (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added));
see also, e.g., Ex parte Benedict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 174 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292) (Hall, J.)
(“Such a suspension may prevent the prisoner’s discharge; but it leaves untouched the
question of the illegality of his arrest, imprisonment, and deportation. If these are
unlawful, the marshal and others engaged in these arrests are liable in damages in a civil
prosecution; such damages to be assessed by a jury of the country.”). But cf., e.g., Ex parte
Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442, 445 (9th Cir. 1942) (Healy, J.) (“It is little to the purpose to
attempt here an analysis of distinctions between suspension of the privilege and
suspension of the writ.”). It is not particularly surprising that these distinctions are no
longer understood, as this and much else relating to the Constitution’s original public
meaning was forgotten even as early as Lincoln’s day, and, in regard to a few
constitutional provisions and language, sometimes far earlier. But it is curious how few
even notice there is a puzzle to be solved or a past to be explained. See, e.g., 1 BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 25 (1968)
(“This Milligan language has been repeated in more recent cases. One may wonder,
nevertheless, whether there is [a] basis for the claimed distinction between suspension of
the privilege and suspension of the writ.” (footnote omitted) (citing Zimmerman, 132 F.2d
at 445)); Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 423 n.73 (2006) (“The text of the Suspension Clause makes clear
that it is the ‘Privilege of the Writ,’ not the writ itself, that may be suspended. . . .
Nevertheless, courts and commentators tend to refer colloquially to ‘suspending the writ’
or ‘suspending habeas,’ . . . .” (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 130–31)); Trevor W. Morrison,
Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1535 n.3 (2007)
(“‘[S]uspending the writ’ and ‘suspending habeas’ are common shorthands for suspending
the privilege of the writ, and I will use them here.” (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 130–31));
Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 979 (1998) (asserting that the Milligan Court’s “distinction [between
the privilege and the writ] cuts against the conventional phrase, ‘suspension of the writ,’
which nonetheless has brevity in its favor”). But see, e.g., William Baude, The Judgment
Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1853 n.255 (2008) (pointing out the same textual distinction
regarding the “privilege” of the writ and the writ itself, but not resolving the distinction);
Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Arguments
Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004) (“The general
consensus, even prior to the Civil War, was that suspension did not mean that habeas
corpus itself was suspended, but rather that the privilege guarded by the writ was
suspended.” (citing WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 42
(photo. reprt. 1997) (1893))); Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article 1,
Section 9, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2005) (“The privilege of the writ can be construed as separate from
the writ itself; the privilege may be viewed as the ends (‘discharge, bail, or a speedy trial’)
and the writ itself as merely the means towards this end.” (quoting W ILLIAM F. DUKER ,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 141–42, 171 n.121 (1980))); Note,
Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1265–66 (1970)
(denominating the Milligan Court’s discussion of the Suspension Clause’s “privilege of the
writ” language as “cryptic,” and suggesting that “the [Milligan] Court saw the ‘privilege’
as the further proceedings and the eventual discharge. By the ‘writ’ the Court meant what
is referred to today as a show cause order, i.e., not an order to produce the body but a
preliminary request for a ‘return,’ or written justification of the detention.” (footnote
omitted)); Bautz, supra note 9 passim (collecting some early authorities addressing the
distinction). Compare, e.g., Emily Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy
Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 121–22 n.216 (2008) (citing Milligan for the proposition
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that habeas jurisprudence distinguishes executive accountability goals from remedial goals
and phases of habeas litigation), with John Harrison, The Original Meaning of the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause 3 (University of Virginia School of Law Public Law & Legal
Theory Paper Series 2018-47, Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3227985 (“A
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is legislation granting the
executive extremely broad discretion to detain.”), with id. at 40 (“[T]he privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is the legal interest that the writ characteristically protects. To
suspend that privilege is to contract that legal interest temporarily.”), with Lee Kovarsky,
Prisoners and Habeas Privileges under the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609,
614–15 (2014) (“The privilege is a prisoner’s entitlement to ask that the habeas power be
exercised.”), and Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension A Political Question, 59 STAN. L. REV.
333, 396–97 (2006) (conflating the initial and subsequent phases of habeas litigation, but
still citing Milligan without explanation).
My view is that suspension of the evidentiary privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
precludes a court (or even an Executive Branch officer) from taking cognizance of a party’s
pleading (or invoking) the writ (once granted to that party by that court or any other
court of record) in subsequent contempt and enforcement proceedings (and, perhaps, in
other collateral and ancillary proceedings). For example, Merryman II (i.e., granting an
order to serve an attachment for contempt where the defendant failed to produce the
prisoner-plaintiff). Suspending the writ (as opposed to suspending the privilege of the
writ) precludes a court from granting the writ, on the merits, in the first instance.
For example, Merryman I (i.e., an ex parte habeas order to produce a prisoner), or a
Merryman III-like order (i.e., a habeas order to release a prisoner—albeit, of course,
this did not actually happen in Merryman). When both the writ and/or the privilege of
the writ are suspended, federal courts (having general federal question jurisdiction)
will still have jurisdiction to determine if the suspension or suspensions themselves are
constitutional—unless Congress has validly stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction to
do so. The scope of Congress’s power to engage in such jurisdiction stripping is a complex
subject, and one well beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1398 (1953) (“[W]here statutory jurisdiction to issue the writ obtains,
but the privilege of it has been suspended in particular circumstances, the Court has
declared itself ready to consider the validity of the suspension and, if it is found invalid, of
the detention.”); Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C.
L. REV. 251, 289 (2005). See generally Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.
1948) (Chase, J.). Recently, the Suspension Clause has received renewed interest and
full-length treatment in books, but the meaning of the clause’s text, its actual words—they
remain largely an undiscovered country. See generally, e.g., TYLER, supra, at 3–4, 15, 99,
123, 133, 359 (taking a historical approach absent textual analysis); Amanda L. Tyler,
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 678 n.372 (2009) (citing Neuman,
supra, at 979 favorably). But see, e.g., Baude, supra, at 1853 n.255; but cf., e.g., Bautz, supra
note 9 passim.
I have put down some truly remarkable support for my position here in another paper
which this Article is too small to contain. Cf. Seth Barrett Tillman, A Play on the Suspension
Clause, NEW REFORM CLUB (Aug. 11, 2016, 4:04 PM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2016/08/aplay-on-suspension-clause.html [http://perma.cc/HP6M-YTBJ]. Indeed, I submitted a prior draft
of this lengthy footnote as my abstract to the Tenth Annual Originalism Works-in-Progress
Conference. See Tenth Annual Hugh & Hazel Darling Foundation Originalism Works-in-Progress
Conference, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW (last visited July 27, 2018),
http://www.sandiego.edu/events/law/detail.php?_focus=66934 [http://perma.cc/RXD9-FA8C];
see also Seth Barrett Tillman, What is the “Privilege” of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?, NEW REFORM
CLUB (July 27, 2018, 2:41 AM), https://tinyurl.com/ycupmlu7 [http://perma.cc/Y695-PLGV].
16 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 485. Here and throughout this Article, I quote freely
from my 2016 Military Law Review publication. See id. at 483–85.
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B. Merryman I: The Ex Parte Order to Produce the Prisoner
John Merryman was from a long-established land-owning
and politically connected Maryland family, as was his wife.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, he had already been elected to
public office as a member and president of the Baltimore County
Commission.17 Rightly or not, federal military authorities suspected
John Merryman of being an officer of a pro-secession militia group
which allegedly had conspired to destroy (and did destroy) bridges
and railway lines. As a result, at around 2:00 AM, on Saturday, May
25, 1861, United States Army personnel seized Merryman, and they
subsequently transferred him to and detained him at Fort McHenry
in Maryland.18 The next day—Sunday, May 26, 1861—Merryman’s
Maryland counsel, George M. Gill and George H. Williams, presented
Merryman’s habeas corpus petition to Chief Justice Roger Brooke
Taney at the Chief Justice’s Washington home.19 Later that day,
Sunday, May 26, 1861, the Chief Justice issued an ex parte order,
Merryman I, directing General George Cadwalader, the only
named defendant and the Army officer having overall command of
the military district including Fort McHenry: (i) to appear before
Chief Justice Taney the next day—on Monday, May 27, 1861 at
11:00 AM—in a court room in Baltimore; (ii) to explain the legal
basis for Merryman’s detention by military authorities; and (iii) to
“produce”20 (as opposed to “release”) the body of John Merryman at
that hearing.21
The writ, i.e., Merryman I, was issued by Chief Justice
Taney and served by the United States Marshal on General
Cadwalader the same day: Sunday, May 26, 1861, at around 5:30
PM.22 The hearing was scheduled for Monday, May 27, 1861, at
11:00 AM. As a result, Cadwalader, a Pennsylvania native, had
less than one full business day: (i) to consult (much less
coordinate) with the United States Attorney for Maryland, with
the Attorney General in Washington, and with the Army’s law
officers; and (ii) to find a private attorney in the Maryland bar to
represent his personal interests in high-stakes litigation.23 As a
result, it is not entirely surprising that Cadwalader chose not to
attend the May 27, 1861 hearing. Instead, he sent Colonel R. M.
Lee.24 At the hearing, Colonel Lee presented the court with a

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

See id. at 485 & n.11.
See id. at 487 & n.13.
See id. at 488 & n.14.
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.).
See Tillman, supra note 2, at 488.
See id. at 499 n.47.
See id.
See id. at 512 n.73.
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signed response from Cadwalader laying out the General’s
defense. For example, Cadwalader argued that habeas corpus had
been lawfully suspended under presidential authority. Cadwalader’s
response also sought a postponement to seek additional direction
from the President if the court should determine that Cadwalader’s
defense was insufficient. Furthermore, Cadwalader did not produce
Merryman at the hearing as he was instructed to do by Chief Justice
Taney’s ex parte order.25
C. Merryman II: The Attachment
Because General Cadwalader, the named defendant, failed to
produce Merryman, Chief Justice Taney, on May 27, 1861,
directed the United States Marshal to serve an attachment for
contempt on Cadwalader.26 The Marshal sought to serve the
attachment on the morning of Tuesday, May 28, 1861 at Fort
McHenry, but the Marshal was not admitted. Many at the time,
including perhaps Chief Justice Taney and others since, believed,
and continue to believe, that this was a Cromwellian
civilian-military confrontation.27 In other words, the military
authorities prevailed not as a matter of established legal right as
determined by the courts, but because the Army (which was
acting under the direction of the President) had greater firepower
than the United States Marshal (who was serving the
attachment order under instructions from the Chief Justice). As
a result, the Marshal left the Fort.28 He reached the courthouse
prior to noon on May 28, 1861, and he came without Cadwalader
and Merryman.29
D. Merryman III: The Final Order
In his opinion, Chief Justice Taney expressed the view that
the President had no unilateral power to suspend habeas corpus.
In other words, under the Constitution, only Congress can suspend
habeas corpus. He also took the position that “[a] military officer
has no right to arrest and detain a person not subject to the rules
and articles of war, for an offence against the laws of the United
States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its
control.”30 For those reasons, he concluded: “It is, therefore, very

25
26
27
28
29
30

See id. at 489–90.
See id. at 490.
See id.
See id. at 491 n.25.
See id. at 490–91.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 145 & 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, C.J.).
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clear that John Merryman, the petitioner, is entitled to be set at
liberty and discharged immediately from imprisonment.”31
Noting that his attachment order, Merryman II, “ha[d] been
resisted by a force too strong for me [Taney] to overcome,”32 Chief
Justice Taney’s final judicial order did not command Cadwalader,
Lincoln, the Army, or anyone else to release Merryman. Instead,
Chief Justice Taney’s final order directed the clerk of the Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland to transmit a copy of the
proceedings and his opinion to President Lincoln, where it would
“remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitutional
obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process
of the United States to be respected and enforced.”33 Merryman
was not released as a consequence of Chief Justice Taney’s
decision, nor was he brought before a military tribunal. Instead,
Merryman remained detained at Fort McHenry until he was
transferred to the federal civilian authorities, and then he was
indicted for treason in the District Court for Maryland on July
10, 1861. He was released on bail on or about July 13, 1861.
Merryman was never brought to trial.34
Again, Chief Justice Taney delivered an oral opinion on May
28, 1861, which ended live proceedings in court. Subsequently, on
Saturday, June 1, 1861, he filed an extensive written opinion. The
written opinion was put on file with the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Maryland.35
Chief Justice Taney’s final order (not his opinion) stated:
I shall, therefore, order all the proceedings in this case, with my
opinion, to be filed and recorded in the [C]ircuit [C]ourt of the United
States for the [D]istrict of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a
copy, under seal, to the [P]resident of the United States. It will then
remain for that high officer, in fulfilment of his constitutional
obligation to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed,” to
determine what measures he will take to cause the civil process of the
United States to be respected and enforced.36
Id. at 147; Tillman, supra note 2, at 492.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153.
Id. (quoting the Take Care Clause).
See Tillman, supra note 2, at 493.
See id. at 491–92.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153 (quoting the Take Care Clause) (emphasis added).
This is the order as reported in Federal Cases. The report of the order in the case’s file
(storing the original documents) in the Maryland state archives is even more limited than
what is reported in Federal Cases. See 1 June 1861, Order that opinion be filed and recorded
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, directing the Clerk
transmit a copy under seal to the President of the United States, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND
(BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES ): JOHN MERRYMAN (1824–1881) (last visited July 13, 2018),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001500/001543/html/casepapers.html.
31
32
33
34
35
36
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In short, Chief Justice Taney’s final judicial order,
Merryman III, did not command Cadwalader or anyone else to
release Merryman. Instead, Chief Justice Taney’s final order
meekly directed the clerk of the Circuit Court for the District of
Maryland merely to transmit a copy of the proceedings and his
(i.e., the Chief Justice’s) opinion to President Lincoln.37 The
express language of the order itself left it to the President to
determine the scope of his own response.
As explained, Professor Yoo’s claim is that “Lincoln’s
[conduct amounted to] blatant defiance in declining to obey a
judicial order.”38 To be clear, Professor Yoo’s claim is not that
Cadwalader, Lincoln’s military subordinate, disobeyed a court
order. (Such a claim would be true: Cadwalader did disobey
Merryman I: the ex parte order—albeit, Cadwalader’s conduct
can be explained as consistent with standard practices in the
context of ex parte temporary restraining orders.39) Nor is
Professor Yoo’s claim that Lincoln authorized the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus prior to Merryman’s seizure by the
Army. (Such a claim would be true: Lincoln, in fact, did authorize
such a suspension—albeit, its legal validity can be questioned.)
Rather, Professor Yoo’s claim is that after Chief Justice Taney
issued an order (Merryman I, Merryman II, and/or Merryman III),
Lincoln “declin[ed] to obey” it, and that such inactivity can be
fairly characterized as “blatant defiance.”
The only defendant in Merryman was General Cadwalader.
Lincoln was not a named party in Merryman. Lincoln was not
served with process. Lincoln had no meaningful notice and
opportunity to be heard during the judicial proceedings while they
were ongoing.40 Indeed, there is no good evidence that Lincoln even
knew of the proceedings until May 30, 1861—after live judicial
proceedings had ended on May 28, 1861.41 Likewise, Lincoln would
not have received the final order, Merryman III, along with Chief
Justice Taney’s written opinion, from the clerk of the court, until
on or after June 1, 1861, when the final order was signed and filed
with the circuit court—again all after live judicial proceedings had
ended on May 28, 1861.42 As a general rule, a stranger to a
lawsuit—a non-party—a person who had no opportunity to be
See Tillman, supra note 2, at 492.
Yoo, Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power, supra note 1, at 222.
39 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 515–18.
40 See id. at 495 n.44.
41 Albeit, it is possible that Lincoln read newspaper reports of Merryman on the
evening of May 27, 1861 or that Lincoln received correspondence from Army law officers
as early as the 27th. Neither of which amounts to notice and the opportunity to be heard
in the sense of how that phrase is ordinarily used. See id. at 500 n.49.
42 See id. at 498–500, 499 n.48, 537.
37
38
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heard—is not bound to obey any judicial order issued in such
a lawsuit.43 As a non-party, Lincoln no more “ignored” or
“declin[ed] to obey” the three judicial orders in Merryman than
did Jefferson Davis, or you, or me.44 Suggesting that Lincoln
“defi[ed]” such an order is strange, and characterizing Lincoln’s
conduct as “blatant defiance” is stranger still. If the thrust of
Professor Yoo’s claim was that Lincoln had been in privity45 with
Cadwalader, and for that reason accountable for Cadwalader’s
conduct or culpable for his (i.e., Lincoln’s) own failure to conform
to Chief Justice Taney’s orders, such an argument has yet to be
made by Professor Yoo or by anyone else.
I suspect that the real gravamen of Professor Yoo’s position is
not that Lincoln was a party (or in privity with a party) and formally
bound by the orders as a party (or privy) might be.46 Rather, I suspect
that Professor Yoo’s position is that, under the Take Care Clause,
President Lincoln, as General Cadwalader’s ultimate superior at the
top of the chain of command, had ongoing supervisory responsibility
for Cadwalader’s conduct—before, during, and after the conclusion
of Merryman.47 Is it really so obvious that a superior’s failure to
supervise a subordinate, where the subordinate acts lawlessly,
should be characterized as “defiance,” much less “blatant
defiance”? If this is Professor Yoo’s position, it is, at the very
least, undertheorized. What the exact scope of the President’s
duties (if any) under the Take Care Clause remains unsettled
even today—it was certainly unsettled in 1861—and even
assuming that any judicially cognizable duties (as opposed to
abstract, non-justiciable, or aspirational political obligations) flow
from that constitutional provision, any such duties must have been
greatly attenuated under the conditions faced by Lincoln during a
political crisis and a hot civil war. Characterizing Lincoln’s
conduct as “blatant defiance,” and making that charge stick,
requires more, much more, than Professor Yoo’s ipse dixit.

43 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see also D’Arcy
v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 176 (1850) (Catron, J.).
44 In 2016, after some six hours of closely proofreading the penultimate draft of my
Military Law Review article with me, my Irish legal research assistant left my office and
said: “I am going home now—where I intend to ignore the Chief Justice’s order.” See
Tillman, supra note 2, at 481 n.* (thanking Paul Brady LLB). He got it.
45 See generally Martin, 490 U.S. passim.
46 There is no occasion to address whether Lincoln violated Chief Justice Taney’s opinion.
Even assuming that one can defy an opinion, whatever that might mean, Professor Yoo has
made no such claim. Professor Yoo’s article spoke to declining to obey and defying a judicial
order, not an opinion. See Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 126 (1999) (“The operative legal act performed by a court is the entry of
a judgment; an opinion is simply an explanation of reasons for that judgment.”).
47 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause).
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Finally, which order does Professor Yoo think Lincoln
“declin[ed] to obey” and “blatantly def[ied]”? As to Merryman I and
Merryman II, by May 30, 1861, when Lincoln first had a report of
the case,48 live judicial proceedings had already ended and actual
compliance with these preliminary orders (as written) was no longer
feasible. It was no longer possible to “produce” John Merryman at
the hearing—which is what Merryman I demanded—because the
hearing had already ended. Likewise, once the final order had been
issued, once litigation had ended, Merryman II—the attachment for
civil contempt—was a legal nullity.49 More importantly, compliance
was no longer possible: the attachment order demanded that
Cadwalader appear before Chief Justice Taney on May 28, 1861,
at noon. After May 28, 1861, compliance with this order—as
written—was no longer possible. What about Merryman III? Did
Lincoln “decline to obey” or “blatantly defy” that order? The simple
answer is “no.” Again, Lincoln was not a party—so he had no
obligation to obey any order. More importantly, the order did not
direct Lincoln (or anyone else) to take any specific course of conduct
in regard to John Merryman (or any other habeas applicant).50 So
any critique of Lincoln’s conduct based on his (purported) passively
failing to obey or his (purported) actively “defy[ing],” much less
“blatantly defy[ing],” the Merryman III order, makes little sense. To
be clear, this interpretation of Merryman III, i.e., that Lincoln could
not have defied the order because no concrete relief was awarded, is
not some modern invention. This view was well understood by
Lincoln’s contemporaries. During the Civil War, judges, other
than Chief Justice Taney, sitting on federal and state courts,
self-consciously followed the Merryman precedent, which they
understood as granting the habeas applicant no concrete relief.51
Likewise, in responding to President Lincoln’s and the public’s
concerns surrounding Merryman, Attorney General Bates’s July

48 Lincoln received a report from the United States Attorney for Maryland on May
30, 1861. See Tillman, supra note 2, at 499 n.48.
49 See id. at 523 & n.103; Philip A. Hostak, Note, International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal
Contempt, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 181, 185 & n.26 (1995) (“[I]f the underlying controversy
giving rise to a civil contempt action is settled or is otherwise terminated, the contempt
proceeding becomes moot, and the sanctions must end.” (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 452 (1911) (Lamar, J.))).
50 See Tillman, supra note 2, at 492.
51 See Ex parte McQuillon, 16 F. Cas. 347, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 8294) (Betts,
J.) (“[Judge Betts] would, however, follow out that case [Merryman], but would express
no opinion whatever, as it would be indecorous on his part to oppose the [C]hief
[J]ustice. He would therefore decline taking any action on the writ at all.” (emphasis
added)); In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359, 371 (1863) (Dixon, C.J.) (“I deem it advisable, adhering
to the precedent set by other courts and judges under like circumstances, and out of respect
to the national authorities, to withhold [granting habeas relief] until they shall have had
time to consider what steps they should properly take in the case.” (emphasis added)).
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5, 1861 memorandum only addressed the President’s obligations in
situations analogous to Merryman I, i.e., the ex parte preliminary
production order. On its face, Bates’s memorandum did not address
final orders like Merryman III.52 There was simply no need to do so
because Lincoln’s conduct in relation to the final judicial order was
legal in all respects, and obviously so.
Academics should welcome debate—even when our own views
are subjected to the closest scrutiny and critique. But when our
views are contradicted, with novel argument and new evidence, our
response ought not be to continue as if nothing has changed. Now it
may be that the new Merryman narrative,53 and I, have failed (and
will continue to fail) to convince Professor Yoo. But if that is so, I
hope he will tell us (or, at least, me) why. If I have convinced him, I
would urge him to tell his audience: all those who have swallowed
the Merryman-red-pill-to-historical-&-legal-wonderland. Of course,
there is a third possibility—Professor Yoo is not sure. And that
would be the most interesting result of all.

52 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74
(July 5, 1861) (Bates, A.G.). Bates’s memorandum addressed two questions:
1. In the present time of a great and dangerous insurrection, has the President
the discretionary power to cause to be arrested and held in custody, persons
known to have criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or persons against
whom there is probable cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity?
2. In such cases of arrest, is the President justified in refusing to obey a writ of
habeas corpus issued by a court or a judge, requiring him or his agent to
produce the body of the prisoner, and show the cause of his caption and
detention, to be adjudged and disposed of by such court or judge?
Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
53 See supra note 8 (collecting authorities).
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